Trump has stated he will cut American aid to Ukraine, which makes a majority of total aid. Recently Zelensky stated that if Ukraine’s only hope for sovereignty is its own nuclear arsenal, they will build it.

  • golli@lemm.ee
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    17 天前

    Since I see this claim constantly: where in the Budapest memorandum did they promise protection?

    Looking at the Wikipedia summary nowhere does anyone give security assurances similar to NATO article 5 or the even stronger worded mutual defense clause article 42 TEU of the EU. The closest it comes to is in the fourth point, but that is only in the case of nuclear weapons being used. Which obviously hasn’t happened yet. Beyond that it is just a promise not to attack, which Russia has broken, but every other singator has kept. And as far as I can see it does not contain anything that compells others to act on someone else’s breach.

    • haggyg@feddit.uk
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      16 天前

      That’s my understanding. Furthermore, they had the nuclear weapons of the soviet union. Even if they could maintain them at the time, without much of the infrastructure that the soviet Union had, I think legally they were Moscow’s. Moscow held the metaphorical button, if not the physical one. Similar to US nuclear weapons in Germany aren’t controlled by Berlin.

      That being said, I think this whole war has lead to a situation where nuclear armament is very appealing, not just to Kyiv but to many of the similar states looking on. It is again, for world peace we need less nukes in the world, for Ukraine’s sovereign safety, they need (more) nukes.

    • Vailliant@lemmy.world
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      16 天前

      "A resolution passed by the Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, on Nov. 18, 1993, attached conditions to its ratification of START that Russia and the United States deemed unacceptable. Those stated that Ukraine would only dismantle 36 percent of its delivery vehicles and 42 percent of its warheads; all others would remain under Ukrainian custody. Moreover, the resolution made those reductions contingent upon assurances from Russia and the United States to never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine (referred to as “security assurances”), along with foreign aid to pay for dismantlement.

      In response, the Clinton and Yeltsin administrations intensified negotiations with Kyiv, eventually producing the Trilateral Statement, which was signed on Jan. 14, 1994. This agreement placated Ukrainian concerns by allowing Ukraine to cooperate in the transfer of the weapons to Russia, which would take place over a maximum period of seven years. The agreement further called for the transferred warheads to be dismantled and the highly enriched uranium they contained to be downblended into low-enriched uranium. Some of that material would then be transferred back to Ukraine for use as nuclear reactor fuel. Meanwhile, the United States would give Ukraine economic and technical aid to cover its dismantlement costs. Finally, the United States and Russia responded to Ukraine’s security concerns by agreeing to provide security assurances upon its NPT accession.

      In turn, the Rada ratified START, implicitly endorsing the Trilateral Statement. However, it did not submit its instrument of accession to the NPT until Dec. 5, 1994, when Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States provided security assurances to Ukraine. That decision by the Rada met the final condition for Russia’s ratification of START and therefore subsequently brought that treaty into force.

      For more information, see Ukraine, Nuclear Weapons and Security Assurances at a Glance."

      https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/lisbon-protocol-glance

      :::

    • Irremarkable@fedia.io
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      17 天前

      From what I understand, it primarily stems from that first stipulation, specifically from points 1 and 4 of the Helsinki Accords

      (1) Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty (4) Territorial integrity of states

      That said, it was very clearly done in a way that didn’t actually guarantee that protection, and assuming that the Ukrainians thought otherwise is frankly an insult to their intelligence.

    • illi@lemm.ee
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      16 天前

      And that was the issue of the memorandum - it should’ve included something akin to Article 5

      • anticurrent@sh.itjust.works
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        16 天前

        Russia would have never signed on to that. Their whole argument about Ukraine is the constant advancement of NATO territories towards its border.

        • illi@lemm.ee
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          16 天前

          Yeah… and Ukraine clearly shouldn’t have signed without it

      • golli@lemm.ee
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        16 天前

        The issue is that as someone already mentioned i doubt something like that was ever truly on the table.

        I think you can’t give assurances like that in a vacuum. If a nation e.g. the US would grant them, they’d only do so while simultaniously building up a physical presence in the territory and possibly also do deeper integrations military wise. You wouldn’t give such strong assurances while weakening your own ability to act on them.

        For Russia that would have never been acceptable.

    • sunzu2@thebrainbin.org
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      16 天前

      That’s the lesson here… They gave up their nuclear weapons for nothing.

      Zero benefit to the people