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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: June 20th, 2023

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  • Totally agreed, I get it’s easier to consider it a fail if you open the link, and that simply opening a random link has some inherent risk, but there should at least be a fake page to enter credentials and evaluate how many people actually go through with that, and break that out as a CRITICAL where the other clicks are HIGH or MEDIUM status, to classify the risk.

    Also, this is just an anecdote, but in a similar phishing simulation i helped with, we had to bypass filters for rejecting emails with links for websites registered in the last 60 days. Obviously this isn’t a foolproof way to prevent phishing attempts, but it does cut out a lot of junk, and we’ve indirectly been training employees to not deal with that.


  • Abstract from the paper itself:

    This paper empirically evaluates the efficacy of two ubiquitous forms of enterprise security training: annual cybersecurity awareness training and embedded anti-phishing training exercises. Specifically, our work analyzes the results of an 8-month randomized controlled experiment involving ten simulated phishing campaigns sent to over 19,500 employees at a large healthcare organization. Our results suggest that these efforts offer limited value. First, we find no significant relationship between whether users have recently completed cybersecurity awareness training and their likelihood of failing a phishing simulation. Second, when evaluating recipients of embedded phishing training, we find that the absolute difference in failure rates between trained and untrained users is extremely low across a variety of training content. Third, we observe that most users spend minimal time interacting with embedded phishing training material in-the-wild; and that for specific types of training content, users who receive and complete more instances of the training can have an increased likelihood of failing subsequent phishing simulations. Taken together, our results suggest that anti-phishing training programs, in their current and commonly deployed forms, are unlikely to offer significant practical value in reducing phishing risks.

    And the methodology:

    Our study analyzes the performance of nearly 20,000 full-time employees at UCSD Health across eight months of simulated phishing campaigns sent between January 2023 and October 2023. UCSD Health is a major medical center that is part of a large research university, whose employees span a variety of medical roles (e.g., doctors and nurses) as well as a diverse array of “traditional” enterprise jobs such as financial, HR, IT, and administrative staff. For their email infrastructure, UCSD Health exclusively uses Microsoft Office 365 with mail forwarding disabled. On roughly one day per month, UCSD Health sent out a simulated phishing campaign, where each campaign contained one to four distinct phishing email messages depending on the month. Each user received only one of the campaign’s phishing messages per month, where the exact message depended on the group the user was randomly assigned to at the beginning of the study (§ 3.1). In total these campaigns involved ten unique phishing email messages spanning a variety of deceptive narratives (“lures”) described in Section 3.2. All of the phishing lures focused on drive-by-download or credential phishing attacks, where a user failed the phishing simulation if they clicked on the embedded phishing link.






  • All of these claims are easily able to be checked from the archived version of the site . It was not using home grown encryption algorithm.

    The last version released was independently audited and “found no evidence of deliberate backdoors, or any severe design flaws that will make the software insecure in most instances”

    I had never heard of the warrant canary for TrueCrypt, and quickly searching for news of the time, was unable to find anything to indicate that there was ever a mention of NSL on the website, so nothing to remove if they were served with a NSL.


  • My assumption has been that the author was pressured to add a backdoor or abandon the project since it was an issue for law enforcement. After TrueCrypt stopped releasing new versions, it was audited and there was no sign of any backdoor or flaw in the encryption. Now on device encryption is more common but so are cloud backups, and law enforcement has found that going after cloud backups is much easier to subpoena. Plus there is a more mature industry for law enforcement to provide tools tools to bypass encryption without the developer complying.