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- cross-posted to:
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TL;DR - About switching from Linux Mint to Qubes OS from among various other options that try to provide security out-of-the-box (also discussed: OpenBSD, SculptOS, Ghaf, GrapheneOS)
I’m not very good at securing Linux, but from what I’ve seen, NixOS leaves a lot to be desired. It doesn’t officially support SELinux and requires a lot of work to make it function properly. It supports other mandatory access control programs, which I’m not really sure how they compare. The store being world readable is another problem. The most obvious issue with that is if you’re doing business work with two clients on the same computer where infrastructure needs to remain confidential, where one client’s programs can read the store and see information about the other clients, even on separate user accounts.
I think the preferred approach is AppArmor because SELinux is not supported on immutable distros. I’m not a security expert either, but I would not share environments between two clients at all, I would put them in separate VMs
SELinux is used on all the Fedora Immutable distros, and the OpenSUSE Immutable distro. It’s actually much easier to do SELinux in Immutable distros in a lot of ways than non-immutable. Especially the bootc-style ones where even more of the system is defined and prebuilt before deployment.
AppArmor is OK, but the whole issue is that you have to know what to throw into it. That’s also its benefit, you can focus in the high risk things and ignore the low risk things. It keeps expanding profiles more and more though, and ironically the ultimate destination is everything being under MAC.
Well, that’s because it’s a first party solution. From NixOS point of view SELinux is mutating the store which is forbidden
It’s not. SELinux predates Fedora. Fedora went all-in on SELinux pretty early on though (a few other older distros too, but Fedora is one of the few remaining with significant mind-share), and many other distros decided not to do security at all for many years.
AppArmor is “sufficient” if you only want to deal with known-in-advance high risk applications being locked down, which was the approach most other distros took since it’s extremely complex to have a policy for absolutely everything (like SELinix requires).
In the latest distros using AppArmor, it’s been expanding so much that it is arguably easier to just implement SELinux and derive from Fedora’s Standard Policy. Ubuntu 24.04 for example was been broken by thier various AppArmor bugs for almost 1.5 years after release, all because they slapped system-wide AppArmor policy restrictions on the default system and didn’t coordinate any of it.
SELinux also doesn’t mutate the store unless the package in the store failed to set an SELinix file label. Providing the labels in most cases is trivial, so trivial in most cases that a global SELinux Nix policy package exists in a number of distros that can set normal defaults that work for most things.
Setting the label is the mutation
And it’s only necessary because Nix doesn’t include it. Which is the only way anything is allowed to run on an SELinux system. SELinux doesn’t require Nix mutation, it requires Nix to be complete.
There are workarounds to fix Nix’s incomplete definitions, but most end users opt for the easy post-install solution that ends up mutating thier store rather than including the fix as a unique derivation for every package to add the missing SElinux labels and policy.