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Total Words: ~39,000 Total Pages: 101 (iii-xii, 1-101)

Summary: Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry

This RAND Corporation report, authored by Michael J. Mazarr, Amanda Kerrigan, and Benjamin Lenain, analyzes the potential for stabilizing the intense geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. It argues that while the competition is real and driven by conflicting interests, both sides have a critical interest in avoiding conflict and establishing a stable “modus vivendi.” The report provides a framework for stabilization and offers specific recommendations for the overall relationship and three key flashpoints: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the science and technology competition.

Main Points and Analysis

1. The Need and Possibility for Stabilization

• The Rivalry is Dangerous but Can Be Managed: The U.S.-China rivalry poses significant risks of military conflict, economic warfare, and global instability, threatening consensus on issues like climate change and AI (p. 1-2, 4). The authors reject the argument that seeking stability is a sign of weakness or “appeasement,” drawing a parallel to Cold War détente, which they argue ultimately hastened the Soviet Union’s internal crisis rather than strengthening it (p. 2, 14-15).
• A Limited, Not Transformative, Goal: The report’s goal is not to end the rivalry or achieve a grand transformation of the relationship. Instead, it seeks a more limited “stable competition” or “modus vivendi”—a condition of continued rivalry managed by mechanisms that prevent crises, avoid war, and protect each side’s most vital interests (p. 3, 18-19).

2. A Framework for a Stable Rivalry (Chapter 2) The report identifies six principles that define a stable strategic rivalry (p. 22-23): 1. Mutual acceptance that a modus vivendi is necessary. 2. Acceptance of the other’s essential political legitimacy. 3. Development of shared rules and norms in specific issue areas. 4. Restraint in developing capabilities that undermine the other’s existential deterrent. 5. Acceptance of a shared vision of basic organizing principles for world politics. 6. Establishment of mechanisms (e.g., communication links, crisis management) to maintain equilibrium.

Based on these principles, the authors propose six broad-based initiatives for general stabilization (p. 25-27): 1. Clarify U.S. objectives to reject absolute victory and accept the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. 2. Reestablish trusted lines of communication between senior officials. 3. Improve crisis-management practices and agreements. 4. Seek new agreements to limit cyber competition. 5. Declare mutual acceptance of strategic nuclear deterrence. 6. Seek modest cooperative ventures on shared interests (e.g., climate, pandemics).

3. Assessing Chinese Intentions: Is Coexistence Possible? (Chapter 3)

• The chapter critiques recent analyses (by Doshi, Rolland, Rudd, Pottinger) that portray China as having immutable, aggressive goals that preclude coexistence.
• Through re-examination and re-translation of Chinese-language sources, the report argues that Chinese strategic concepts are often more ambiguous and less aggressively expansionist than portrayed (p. 31-43). For example:
  • Taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦) is better understood as “keeping a low profile” for domestic development rather than a sinister “hide and bide” strategy (p. 31-32).
  • The concept of “strategic space” is often framed defensively, as a response to perceived U.S. containment, and is coupled with calls for a stable external environment (p. 44-46).
• Conclusion: While China is assertive and a strategic competitor, its official rhetoric (e.g., Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Community of Common Destiny) and the nuance in its documents suggest there is potential flexibility and an “opening for coexistence,” contradicting the most alarmist interpretations (p. 46-53).

4. Stabilizing Specific Flashpoints (Chapter 4) For each of the three critical issues, the report proposes recommendations in three categories: (A) Broad Political/Signaling, (B) Near-Term Steps, and © Bolder Initiatives for the future.

A. Taiwan (p. 74-77)

• Theory of Success: Create maximum incentive for Beijing to pursue gradual approaches by combining robust deterrence with political reassurances to make a patient strategy comfortable.
• Recommendations:
  • A1. Mutual Reassurances: Exchange statements; the U.S. reaffirming it does not support Taiwan independence, and China reaffirming a preference for peaceful reunification (p. 75).
  • A2. High-Level Dialogue: Establish a regular senior-level dialogue to communicate concerns and avoid surprises (e.g., on military moves, arms sales) (p. 75).
  • A3. Reinforce Deterrence: China should clarify its redlines; the U.S. should work with partners to signal that aggression would make China an international pariah (p. 75).
  • B1. Empowered Track 2 Dialogues: Create unofficial dialogues with strong connections to high-level officials to discuss strategic and operational issues and serve as crisis backchannels (p. 76).
  • B2. Strengthen Military Communications: Maintain and improve existing military-to-military and crisis communications links, which are often cut off during tensions (p. 77).
  • C1. U.S. Leverage with Taiwan: The U.S. should use its influence to ensure Taiwan’s actions do not escalate tensions, as part of burden-sharing (p. 77).

B. South China Sea (p. 80-82)

• Theory of Success: Combine deterrence of military escalation with intensified multilateral diplomacy to establish a peaceful resolution as the default process.
• Recommendations:
  • A1. Clarify Treaty Obligations: The U.S. and Philippines should jointly clarify the actions that would invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty (p. 80).
  • A2. Chinese Red Lines: China should clarify its specific redlines regarding other claimants’ actions (p. 80).
  • A3. Coordinated Statements: Issue mutual statements recognizing China’s security interests and U.S. commitments to maritime freedom (p. 81).
  • B1. Mutual Restraint: Agree to forswear specific actions around flashpoints like the Second Thomas Shoal (p. 81).
  • B2. Bilateral Code of Conduct: Build on the July 2024 provisional agreement to develop a bilateral code for incident management (p. 81).
  • B3. Reduce Publicity of Operations: The U.S. could selectively reduce the publicity of FONOPs and ISR flights to test for reciprocal Chinese restraint (p. 81).
  • C1. Doctrinal Shifts: Both sides could shift military doctrine from “offense and control” to “defense and access” (p. 81-82).
  • C2. Negotiate U.S. Operations: The U.S. could privately signal a willingness to negotiate some ISR/FONOP activity conditional on China moderating its claims (p. 82).

C. Science and Technology Competition (p. 83-85)

• Theory of Success: Manage the worst risks of emerging technologies while stepping back from extreme efforts to undermine the other’s progress.
• Recommendations:
  • A1. Political Reassurances: Offer statements that the U.S. does not seek to retard China’s general development and welcomes cooperation in non-threatening areas (p. 83).
  • A2. Track 1.5 Dialogues: Initiate government-nongovernment dialogues on emerging tech (especially AI and biotech) to build mutual understanding (p. 84).
  • B1. Deterrent Commitments: Clarify that attacks on critical S&T infrastructure (e.g., labs, data centers) will be met with proportional responses (p. 84).
  • B2. Reciprocal Restraint: Formalize agreements to limit gain-of-function research, AI-enabled cyberattacks in peacetime, and AI in nuclear command and control (p. 84).
  • B3. Deepen AI Dialogue: Build on existing intergovernmental AI dialogues to address risks more seriously (p. 84).
  • B4. Expand Basic Science Collaboration: Identify limited, non-sensitive areas for joint basic research under the U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (p. 84-85).
  • C1. AI Loss-of-Control Cooperation: Undertake deeper cooperation with other nations to assess and mitigate potential AI misalignment dangers (p. 85).
  • C2. Return to Deep Collaboration: In a future thaw, identify areas for a significant return to deep collaboration between U.S. and Chinese universities and researchers (p. 85).

Overall Conclusion

The report concludes that while the proposed agenda is ambitious and faces significant political barriers, stabilizing the U.S.-China rivalry is an urgent and necessary goal. The path forward involves a combination of improved dialogue, targeted deterrent commitments, tangible mutual restraint, and formalized mechanisms to manage competition and avoid conflict. The authors stress that seeking stability is not an alternative to firmness but a complementary strategy to make intense competition sustainable and less risky (p. 85-86).