Could there be collaborative moderation where node admins volontarily block other nodes or onion services that host CSAM?
I wonder if that’s technically possible for a hidden service directory or rendez-vous point to do that. It wouldn’t completely kill those services, but may at least make less Tor resources available to them.
The trickiest question may not be technical but organisational. The Tor project probably doesn’t want to be in a position to validate/decide block requests. Different entities all over the world would ask for blocks, for many different kind of contents.
In the network formerly known as freenet, forgetting the current name, traffic to and from the node, and the data at rest is all encrypted, only referenced by keys so nobody has a real influence on what they store or transmit. Plus, they only know the peer that made a request, not a source or a destination, so just ‘pass this key back to me if you have it, otherwise ask the next person’, so routing is just as opaque.
In cases like that there’s not much to be done, as it well should be because as soon as control can be performed it’ll be demanded or liability placed on those who don’t comply.
Could there be collaborative moderation where node admins volontarily block other nodes or onion services that host CSAM?
I wonder if that’s technically possible for a hidden service directory or rendez-vous point to do that. It wouldn’t completely kill those services, but may at least make less Tor resources available to them.
The trickiest question may not be technical but organisational. The Tor project probably doesn’t want to be in a position to validate/decide block requests. Different entities all over the world would ask for blocks, for many different kind of contents.
I think the problem is that if there is any org able to enforce a ban, then it can and will be compelled to do so on not just CSAM.
In the network formerly known as freenet, forgetting the current name, traffic to and from the node, and the data at rest is all encrypted, only referenced by keys so nobody has a real influence on what they store or transmit. Plus, they only know the peer that made a request, not a source or a destination, so just ‘pass this key back to me if you have it, otherwise ask the next person’, so routing is just as opaque.
In cases like that there’s not much to be done, as it well should be because as soon as control can be performed it’ll be demanded or liability placed on those who don’t comply.