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- cross-posted to:
- [email protected]
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What does that even mean?
I mean if you have ever tried to measure anything large and complex you know individual numbers can only ever represent a small part of the relevant details.
More people? Then how does their experience level and training level compare to what they had before? More equipment? How modern is it? How many of the consumables it requires are available in suitable numbers? How many of their people are trained in its use? Is it in a place where it is needed are thousands of kilometers away?
Size rarely matters, what really matters is where the bottlenecks are, so basically not how much you have total but how much do you have of exactly what you need right now and in which areas do you not have enough of exactly what you need? How well can you substitute other things (e.g. less trained troops at higher casualty rates),…
The answers are pretty obvious if you actually think about this for even a few minutes. There is no substitute for having real combat experience, and Russia now has a large seasoned army that’s seen serious combat action for two years. Not only does this mean that the troops are far more experienced than any NATO army, but it also forced Russia to iron out any supply chain issues they had, let them test their equipment, and learn the faults that need to be fixed, it resulted in Russia ramping up their military industry to incredible levels. As CNN recently reported, Russia now outproduces all of the west by a ratio of three to one in artillery shell production. This is just one example https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/10/politics/russia-artillery-shell-production-us-europe-ukraine/index.html
Meanwhile, the only western source that provides any methodology shows that Russian casualty rates are relatively low, and have been going down significantly, which is an indication that Russian army is getting better at combat https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng
The whole point of my comment was merely to point out that measuring army size or power as a single value is a flawed way of looking at a complex issue like this but don’t let anything get in the way of spouting some more Russian propaganda.
Do be specific what this Russian propaganda you speak of is. Last I checked, I’m quoting mainstream western publications here. Or perhaps, it’s Royal United Services Institute that’s spreading Russian propaganda I’m parroting, help me understand what you mean here little buddy!
What about the Ukrainian army?
Obviously it is much larger than when they were first invaded. It’s hard to get good numbers on the number of dead and wounded on either side, but this had been a bloody and grinding war for both nations. Russia has a numbers advantage, and Ukraine has made them pay heavily for each advance to keep parity (not including russia’s embarrassing performance at sea); even given that, russia has not been afraid to pay in men to make ground, playing a political game to try to appear successful and hope they win the us elections.
Russia’s strategy can work, if they wear Ukraine down and have time to rebuild during a weakened republican government in the US. I feel this is why some European leaders are rattling sabers… if they can make russia back down while the US would honor its military commitments, the situation can remain stable.
War it’s a matter of numbers. Big numbers are more likely to win.
But anyway let’s see what happens all isn’t about numbers intelligence work it’s involved too, we need to see if at some point Ukraine allies start sending troops but I don’t think so cos eventually Russian allies could do the same and as I said big numbers are important.
The worst thing that can happen to Russia right now is European countries openly sending troops into Ukraine, regardless of numbers. No one can win this war at that point, it is only a matter of how bad the war gets worldwide.
People who actually have a clue on the subject seem to disagree with you there https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine
Good article, Russi is a great source. However my point was that entry of NATO forces would leave russia considering they may open their entire boarder as a front - I would definitely ceed the point if this just related to the current lines in Ukraine.
I feel you’re arguing that european countries wouldn’t be setting a “tripwire” force by entering, but I can see the allure of doing this before trump might end up in office. Europe could leave him entering a war and having to run away to take putin’s side… and while republicans are shameless I think….
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Okay, well I’m pretty sure at least a few of them would be ashamed!
I think that a direct war between NATO and Russia would ultimately lead to a nuclear holocaust. So, hopefully that never happens because we’re all going to die horribly in that scenario. However, the key point of the article is that western industry simply isn’t oriented towards this sort of war, so whether it unfolds within the territory of Ukraine or as a full on conflict between Russia and NATO, the advantage is on Russia’s side in the long run. NATO might make some initial breakthroughs, but it’s highly unlikely that NATO could outright defeat Russia quickly, if that doesn’t happen then it turns into a logistics game.
The other aspect that’s important to keep in mind is China. If Russia was somehow defeated by NATO, then China would be completely surrounded. This is an existential threat from China’s perspective, so China would be supporting Russia in terms of logistics and possibly even directly militarily if push comes to shove. China absolutely dwarfs the west in terms of industrial capacity, so in a war of attrition there is no path to victory for NATO.
Sure, they have more bodies. They increased the maximum conscription age to 30 last year, and keep calling people up by the hundreds of thousands. But a large army is not necessarily a good army, especially if a substantial portion are conscripts.
